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The impact of IMF conditionality on government health expenditure: A cross-
national analysis of 16 West African nations 
 
Abstract: 
How do International Monetary Fund (IMF) policy reforms—so-called ‘conditionalities’—
affect government health expenditures? We collected archival documents on IMF 
programmes from 1995-2014 to identify the pathways and impact of conditionality on 
government health spending in 16 West African countries. Based on a qualitative analysis of 
the data, we find that IMF policy reforms reduce fiscal space for investment in health, limit 
staff expansion of doctors and nurses, and lead to budget execution challenges in health 
systems. Further, we use cross-national fixed effects models to evaluate the relationship 
between IMF-mandated policy reforms and government health spending, adjusting for 
confounding economic and demographic factors and for selection bias. Each additional 
binding IMF policy reform reduces government health expenditure per capita by 0.248 
percent (95% CI -0.435 to -0.060). Overall, our findings suggest that IMF conditionality 
impedes progress toward the attainment of Universal Health Coverage. 
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1. Introduction 
Strengthening public healthcare systems is central to achieving Universal Health Coverage 
(UHC), a key objective of the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (UNGA, 
2015; WHO, 2014). Yet, in low-income countries (LICs), especially those dependent on aid 
or subject to fluctuating commodity prices, it is unclear how progress can be sustained. 
Recent studies highlight the importance of funding UHC through increasing domestic tax 
revenues and employer contributions  (O’Hare, 2015; Reeves et al., 2015). Success will also 
depend on the ability to overcome longstanding barriers to health system expansion, 
including legacies of conflict, state failure, and underinvestment in healthcare facilities and 
personnel (Benton & Dionne, 2015). Foreseeably, a multitude of global actors will contribute 
to shaping the design, implementation, and ultimate outcome of these endeavours (Chorev, 
2012; Patel & Phillips, 2015). 
Quite possibly the most important international institution setting the fiscal priorities of LICs 
is the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Established in 1944, a core function of the 
organization has been to provide financial assistance to countries in economic turmoil. In 
exchange for this support, countries agree to implement IMF-designed policy reform 
packages phased over a period of one or more years—so-called ‘conditionalities’. Over the 
past two decades, the 59 countries classified by the IMF (2015b) as LICs have been exposed 
to conditionalities for 10.3 years on average, or one out of every two years. The IMF’s 
extended presence in LICs has spurred a great deal of controversy. Critics stress 
inappropriate or dogmatic policy design (Babb & Buira, 2005; Babb & Carruthers, 2008; 
Stiglitz, 2002), adverse effects on the economy (Dreher, 2006), and negative social 
consequences (Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2007; Babb, 2005; Oberdabernig, 2013).  
In relation to health, the IMF has long been criticized for impeding the development of public 
health systems (Baker, 2010; Batniji, 2009; Benson, 2001; Benton & Dionne, 2015; Cornia, 
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Jolly, & Stewart, 1987; Goldsbrough, 2007; Kentikelenis, King, McKee, & Stuckler, 2015; 
Kentikelenis, Stubbs, & King, 2015; Ooms & Hammonds, 2009; Stuckler, Basu, & McKee, 
2011; Stuckler, King, & Basu, 2008; Stuckler & Basu, 2009). For example, a recent 
qualitative analysis of IMF programmes in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone found that the 
organization contributed to the failure of health systems to develop, thereby exacerbating the 
Ebola crisis (Kentikelenis et al., 2015a). The IMF’s policy advice was associated with fewer 
public health resources, difficulties in hiring and retaining health workers, and unsuccessful 
health sector reforms. The IMF responded by arguing that its programmes strengthen health 
systems (Clements, Gupta, & Nozaki, 2013; Gupta, 2010, 2015). Box 1 summarises the 
debate between the IMF and its critics.  
 [Box 1 about here] 
To revisit these controversies, we use original documents collected from the IMF’s Archives 
to examine whether and how IMF-mandated policy reforms have impacted government 
health expenditures in West Africa. We also construct a novel dataset of IMF-mandated 
policy reforms to evaluate quantitatively the impact of IMF lending conditionalities on 
government health spending in the region. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Data sources and study design 
We collected 484 documents—primarily loan agreements and staff reports—from the IMF 
Archives in Washington DC and online pertaining to the 16 West African countries (UN 
Statistics Division classification): Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, and Togo. When requesting a loan from the IMF, countries send a letter to its 
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management setting out the loan specifics (e.g. amount and duration), main objectives, and 
associated conditionality. These documents—drafted by country policymakers in 
collaboration with IMF staff—are known as Letters of Intent with attached Memoranda of 
Economic and Financial Policies, and are reviewed and updated in regular intervals. For 
example, a programme that is reviewed five times over its duration is linked to six Letters of 
Intent and Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policies: one for the original approval and 
then one for each review. The IMF also produces its own staff report to accompany each 
Letter of Intent, which contains information on macroeconomic developments, policy 
discussions, programme monitoring, as well as a concluding staff appraisal. We use these 
documents in a mixed methods research strategy. In doing so, we seek to avoid the risks of 
presenting selective evidence that can be associated with qualitative research, while yielding 
nuanced accounts that supplement statistical associations and illuminate causal pathways. 
First, to map potential mechanisms of how IMF policies impact government health spending, 
we searched our archival material for information related to health systems and social 
protection policies. Our search terms included ‘health’, ‘medic*’, ‘pharm*’, ‘pro-poor’, 
‘social’, ‘poverty’, ‘labor’, and other related keywords. To ensure that outliers were not 
captured, we only report pathways for which evidence was identified in three or more 
countries. While these mechanisms provide expositional clarity, they should not be viewed as 
wholly representative of the countries considered. That is, not all pathways apply to all 
countries under study (or during all IMF programmes), and it is possible that additional 
pathways exist that we were unable to capture. To our knowledge, this study is among the 
first to systematically deploy the IMF’s own primary documents to identify specific IMF 
policy reforms related to health. 
Second, we utilised these records to develop a new measure of exposure to IMF influence, 
which we then employed to quantify the association between IMF programmes and 
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government health expenditures. We extracted all IMF loan conditions applicable to West 
African countries between 1995 and 2014, and disaggregated them into those which are 
binding and non-binding. During conditionality extraction and classification, we replicated 
coding to ensure inter-coder reliability and minimize measurement error.  
In our quantitative analysis, we focus on binding conditions because they directly determine 
scheduled disbursements of loans, whereas non-binding conditions serve as markers for 
broader progress assessment (IMF, 2001b)—that is, non-implementation does not 
automatically suspend the loan—and may thus introduce noise to the analysis if included. 
Web Appendix 1 provides further details on the categories of conditions. 
Our measure advances on previous research, which has relied on dummy variables or 
numbers of years of exposure to characterise IMF influence and has therefore overlooked 
heterogeneity in conditionality across programmes (Murray & King, 2008). While the IMF 
has its own conditionality database, known as Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA), 
this database has been criticized by researchers and the IMF’s own Independent Evaluation 
Office (Arpac, Bird, & Mandilaras, 2008; IEO, 2007a; Mercer-Blackman & Unigovskaya, 
2004). First, the data is collected ad hoc from IMF desk economists, rather than being 
sourced directly from the loan agreements (Mercer-Blackman & Unigovskaya, 2004). Second, 
the data is presented in a way that precludes use in academic research: a large number of 
conditions are duplicates (thereby necessitating extensive and error-prone data cleaning), a 
break in reporting exists in 2002, and some reported conditions lack crucial information like 
the intended date of implementation. Third, underreporting and misclassification of 
conditions is ubiquitous in the MONA database (IEO, 2007a; Mercer-Blackman & 
Unigovskaya, 2004).  
Figure 1 summarizes the conditions applicable in all IMF loans for each country in Africa 
between 1995 and 2014, recorded from our own research. As shown, West Africa stands out 
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as having the highest number of conditions across the continent, totalling 8,344 (4,886 
binding and 3,458 non-binding) across the 16 countries.  
 [Figure 1 about here]   
2.2 Statistical models  
We investigate the effects of IMF conditionality on government health spending per capita 
reported by the World Bank (2015), which covers the period 1995-2012. We take the natural 
logarithm of this variable due to its skewed distribution. In a separate analysis, we also 
examine government health spending as a share of GDP. Results did not substantively change, 
so we present these findings in Web Appendix 6. We report additional data sources and 
descriptive statistics in Web Appendix 2. 
Following previous research, we include several controls in the analysis. First, we control for 
GDP per capita because health spending is expected to increase as economic development 
takes place (Brady & Lee, 2014; Nooruddin & Simmons, 2006; Wagner, 1994). Second, we 
include overseas development assistance, as it may provide additional funds that the state can 
spend on health or—alternatively—displace health spending from the government to the non-
government sector (Lu et al., 2010). Third, we control for the dependency ratio—i.e., the 
combined share of the population aged under 15 and over 65—as it is expected to be 
associated with higher expenditures due to the greater health burdens of these age groups 
(Nooruddin & Simmons, 2009). Fourth, we include a variable for levels of urbanisation, since 
urban dwellers can mobilize demands for additional healthcare services from governments, 
and cities also offer economies of scale (Baqir, 2002; Bates, 1981). Fifth, given the 
propensity of violent conflict to inflict costly damages on public health infrastructures, we 
control for the occurrence of war (Ghobarah, Huth, & Russett, 2003). Sixth, we introduce 
country fixed effects to account for time-invariant country-level characteristics, and year 
fixed effects to control for common external shocks across all countries. 
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Because countries are not randomly assigned into a ‘treatment group’ of IMF programme 
participants in a given year, we also need to control for unobservable factors—such as the 
political will to implement reforms—that affect both IMF participation and government 
health spending (Vreeland, 2003). If we fail to account for these unobserved factors, then 
their effect will be incorrectly attributed to IMF conditionality. Following previous studies 
(Clements et al., 2013; Dreher & Walter, 2010; IEO, 2003; Kentikelenis, Stubbs, et al., 2015; 
Nooruddin & Simmons, 2006; Wei & Zhang, 2010), we control for bias due to non-random 
country selection into IMF programmes by including the inverse-Mills ratio in our model 
(Heckman, 1979). These values are generated in a separate probit model predicting IMF 
programme participation in Web Appendix 5. A significantly negative coefficient on the 
inverse-Mills ratio indicates that unobserved variables that make IMF participation more 
likely are associated with lower government health expenditure; a significantly positive 
coefficient indicates that unobserved variables that make IMF participation more likely are 
associated with higher government health expenditure (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, et al., 2015). 
We employ cross-national multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) models using the 
following equation: 
HXPit = α + β1 IMFCONDit-1 + β2 IMFPROGit-1 + β3 GDPPCit-1 + β4 ODAit-1 + β5 DEPit +   
β6 URBANit + β7 WARit + β8 INVMILLSit + μi + ψt + εit 
Here, i is country and t is year. HXP is the natural log of government health expenditure per 
capita in constant 2005 US dollars. IMFCOND is the number of binding conditions (known 
as ‘prior actions’ or ‘performance criteria’) applicable to a country. IMFPROG is a dummy 
variable for whether a country was participating in an IMF programme, included to capture 
effects not related to conditionality (e.g., stemming from the catalytic effect of IMF 
programmes for the involvement of donors). The two IMF variables are correlated at r = 0.58, 
indicating no issues of collinearity (see Web Appendix 4). GDPPC is the natural log of gross 
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domestic product per capita in constant 2005 US dollars. ODA is the natural log of net 
overseas development assistance per capita. These variables enter the model lagged one year 
to correspond with the budget cycle. In addition, DEP, the dependency ratio, URBAN, the 
proportion of the country’s population living in urban areas, and WAR, a dummy variable for 
the occurrence of 1,000 or more deaths in a year from armed conflict, enter the model 
contemporaneously. INVMILLS is the inverse-Mills ratio that controls for non-random 
country selection into IMF programmes. Finally, μ is a set of country dummies (i.e., country 
fixed effects), ψ is a set of period dummies (i.e., year fixed effects), and ε is the error term. 
Standard errors are calculated using the clustered Sandwich estimator, which adjusts for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Im-Pesaran-Shin tests on the dependent variable 
reject the null hypothesis that the panels contain a unit root, whether demeaned, with a time 
trend, or both (Im, Pesaran, & Shin, 2003). Analyses are performed using Stata version 13. 
 
3. Qualitative results 
Our archival research reveals three pathways linking IMF-supported policies to government 
health spending: fiscal space for investment; wage and personnel caps; and health system 
budget execution. 
3.1 Fiscal space for health investment  
IMF programmes in West African nations often included conditions intended to augment 
minimum expenditures in priority areas, including health. If effectively implemented, these  
“priority spending floors” can contribute to increases in budgetary allocations for health (IMF, 
2015a), as in the case of Gambia in 2012 (IMF, 2013). However, Table 1 shows these targets 
were frequently not met in our sample of countries. Of the 210 priority spending floors for 
which we could identify implementation data, only 97 were implemented, about 46%. 
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 [Table 1 about here] 
Moreover, we find evidence that macroeconomic targets set by the IMF—for example, on 
budget deficit reduction or international reserve holdings—crowded out health concerns. 
Cabo Verde provides a case in point. In 2004, IMF staff, concerned by reductions in Cabo 
Verde’s fiscal surplus, warned of “the importance of ensuring, in the medium term, that the 
pace of implementation of their poverty reduction strategy did not exceed available 
resources” (IMF, 2003b, p. 8). In response, Cabo Verdean authorities indicated that meeting 
IMF-mandated fiscal targets would interrupt recruitment of new doctors (IMF, 2003b). The 
country later reported to the WHO a 48% decrease in the number of physicians between 2004 
and 2006 (WHO, 2015).  
Another example is Mali, which was exposed to IMF programmes from 1995 to 2010. In 
2005, when government expenditure on health reached 3.0% of GDP, IMF staff encouraged 
authorities to reduce spending due to concerns that “financing substantial increases of 
education and health sector wages with HIPC [Heavily Indebted Poor Countries] Initiative 
resources might eventually prove unsustainable” (IMF, 2005c, p. 14). Similarly, authorities in 
Benin—a country that met only 10 of its 30 social spending floors—cut poverty reduction 
spending (including health) in 2005 to “ensure achievement of the main fiscal objectives” 
(IMF, 2006a, p. 37). Such patterns were also observed in Guinea and Sierra Leone, where 
recent governments have reported an inability to meet social spending floors due to 
government expenditure reductions mandated in their IMF programmes (IMF, 2014a, 2014b).  
3.2 Health sector wages and personnel  
Of the 320 country-years examined here, West African countries experienced a combined 
total of 211 years with IMF conditions, 45% of which, or 95 years, included conditions 
stipulating layoffs or caps on public-sector recruitment and limits to the wage bill. These 
targets can impede countries’ ability to hire, adequately remunerate, or retain health-care 
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professionals (McColl, 2008), although the IMF has argued that health sector spending is 
protected (Verhoeven & Segura, 2007).  
The case of Ghana is illustrative. In 2005, a series of conditions aimed to reduce the 
country’s public-sector wage bill by 0.6% of GDP over three years (IMF, 2005a). Domestic 
authorities defended wage spending levels on the grounds of, inter alia, social sector needs 
(IMF, 2005b). The Ghanaian Minister of Finance wrote to the IMF that “at the current level 
of remuneration, the civil service is losing highly productive employees, particularly in the 
health sector,” and that wage bill limits raised concern about the country’s ability to meet its 
“goal of bolstering service delivery and value for money” (IMF, 2006b, p. 55). Nonetheless, 
wage ceilings were maintained until the end of the programme in late-2006, during which 
period Ghana experienced a reduction in healthcare staff: nursing and midwifery personnel 
decreased from an estimated 0.92 per 1,000 people in 2004 to 0.68 in 2007; the numbers of 
physicians halved from 0.15 per 1,000 people to 0.07 (WHO, 2015).  
Another case is Sierra Leone, which was exposed to several years of limits placed on public-
sector wage spending (IMF, 2006c). This corresponded to the country experiencing a 
reduction in the already low numbers of physicians, from 0.033 per 1,000 inhabitants in 2004 
to 0.016 in 2008 (WHO, 2015). To counter this, the government launched its Free Health 
Care Initiative buttressed by the promise of a living wage for physicians. Yet, IMF staff 
raised concerns about the fiscal implications and advocated “a more gradual approach to the 
salary increase in the health sector” (IMF, 2010, p. 10). Similarly, when Cote d’Ivoire was 
subject to a wage bill ceiling in 2002, IMF staff expressed concern that pressure from Ivorian 
health workers for salary increases posed a “risk to the program, [and would] derail efforts to 
rein in the wage bill” (IMF, 2002a, p. 24). 
Likewise, Senegal had a decade of wage bill ceilings and hiring freezes under successive IMF 
programmes since 1994. Domestic authorities wrote to the IMF in 2004 that severe personnel 
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shortages had affected the quality of public service in social sectors (IMF, 2004b). Medical 
‘brain drain,’ a phenomenon linked to inadequate remuneration (McColl, 2008), had heavily 
encumbered the country: in the early-2000s, a conservative estimate of the number of 
physicians abroad as a fraction of total Senegalese physicians was 51%, against the sub-
Saharan African mean of 28% (Clemens & Pettersson, 2008).  
3.3 Health system budget execution 
Another element of IMF reforms relevant to health systems in West Africa is the introduction 
of budget monitoring and execution systems. When appropriately designed, such measures 
can contribute to an increase of budgetary allocations on health that reach the intended target 
and reduce leakages. For instance, in the late 1990s, IMF staff noted that Benin consistently 
spent less on health than was approved in budgetary appropriations (IMF, 1998a). The 
organization then prioritised assistance to the country to improve the utilization of social 
sector appropriations (IMF, 1998a), ultimately contributing to higher spending (IMF, 2000).  
We find evidence that steps towards improving budget execution often translated into fiscal 
and administrative decentralisation of health-care systems. In principle, decentralisation can 
make health systems more responsive to local needs, but—in practice—it often created 
governance problems, exacerbating local institutional weaknesses. For instance, following 
IMF advice, Guinean authorities transferred budgetary responsibilities from the central 
government to the prefectural level in the early 2000s (IMF, 2001a, 2002b). Five years later, 
an IMF mission to the country reported “governance problems” that included “insufficient 
and ineffective decentralisation”, while also noting deterioration in the quality of health-
service delivery (IMF, 2007, p. 4).  
Mali’s decentralisation of health services in the late-1990s under IMF tutelage was similarly 
problematic (IMF, 1998b). By 2004, IMF staff reported that “the effectiveness of the 
devolution process has been limited so far” due to “insufficient human and financial 
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resources at the local level, and weak coordination of sectoral policies at the local and central 
levels” (IMF, 2004a, p. 16). Likewise, Burkina Faso experienced execution issues following 
the introduction of a decentralized management system for health while under an IMF 
programme in the late-1990s (IMF, 1997). Several years later, IMF staff reported that “the 
lack of a fully operational decentralized administrative structure did not allow for an efficient 
and swift execution of poverty-reducing projects in remote areas” (IMF, 2003a, p. 11). 
Senegal also introduced IMF-endorsed decentralization measures, including devolution of 
health spending decisions to regional and local authorities. By the mid-2000s, IMF staff 
reported delays in the implementation of health policy reforms due to “weak financial 
programming and monitoring capacities at the decentralized level” (IMF, 2004c, p. 89), and 
noted that “health expenditure declined, owing to low implementation capacity” (IMF, 2005d, 
p. 8). 
 
4. Quantitative results 
Having identified three areas of conditionality linked to reductions in government health 
expenditure, we turn to evaluating this relationship using quantitative methods. Table 2 
presents the results of the cross-national statistical model of the association of IMF 
conditionality and programme participation with government health spending, adjusted for 
potential confounding economic and demographic factors. Since the dependent variable has 
been log-transformed, effects of predictors are interpreted as percent changes in government 
health spending equivalent to the coefficient multiplied by 100 (except where a predictor is 
also log-transformed in which case the multiplication is not required). In Model 1, we 
exclude the IMF conditionality variable but include the IMF programme dummy variable, 
which yields a positive but statistically non-significant association with government health 
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spending. This indicates that the combined effect of the IMF’s credit, technical assistance, aid 
catalysis, and conditionality on government health spending is no different from zero. 
 [Table 2 about here] 
In Model 2, we include the IMF conditionality variable in addition to the IMF programme 
dummy. At standard thresholds of statistical significance, exposure to an additional binding 
IMF condition is associated with a decrease of 0.248% (95% CI -0.435 to -0.060) in 
government health spending per capita. However, outside of the conditionality channel (e.g., 
the IMF’s credit, technical assistance, or catalytic effect on aid), the IMF still does not appear 
to affect health spending. In Figure 2, we illustrate the joint effect of IMF programme 
participation and conditionality on government health spending per capita, varying the 
number of conditions, and compare it against a scenario where there is no IMF programme. 
The plot should be interpreted with caution, as results of a partial Wald test showed that the 
combined IMF condition and programme effect was not statistically different from zero.  
 [Figure 2 about here] 
For control variables, official development assistance is also associated with increases in 
government health spending. As noted earlier, selection into IMF programs is not random, 
which can introduce bias to the analysis. Our model includes the Inverse-Mills ratio to 
control for this issue, finding unobserved factors that make IMF participation more likely are 
associated with higher government health spending. We find no statistically significant 
association for GDP per capita, the dependency ratio, urbanisation, or the occurrence of war. 
Our model explains 91% of the total variation. 
Setting government health spending per capita at the mean value of our entire sample—
$14.66 constant 2005 US dollars—we calculate the effect of one additional IMF condition on 
government health spending as an average reduction of $0.036 per person, all other factors 
held constant. The mean number of binding conditions when countries participate in IMF 
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programmes, at 25 per year, thus corresponds to a reduction of $0.91 per capita (a 6.21% 
decrease in government health spending per capita).  
In robustness checks, presented in Web Appendix 6, we adopt an alternative approach to 
account for endogeneity concerns. We deploy a two-stage-lease-squared model with both 
IMF programme participation and IMF conditionality variables instrumented using United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting affinity with the United States and the total 
number of countries under IMF programmes. UNGA voting patterns provide a measure of 
foreign policy alignment and have been used as an instrument in several previous studies for 
various elements of IMF programmes, including participation, loan amount, and share of 
agreed loan drawn (Barro & Lee, 2005; Dreher, 2006; Oberdabernig, 2013). Countries 
aligned with the United States tend to receive more favourable treatment from the IMF and 
thus would receive fewer binding conditions. For the number of countries under IMF 
programmes, sovereignty costs are perceived to be lower when more countries are on 
programmes, thus prompting additional countries to participate (Oberdabernig, 2013; Sturm, 
Berger, & de Haan, 2005). Both variables are unlikely to affect public health expenditure 
except via the number of binding conditions, thus fulfilling the criteria of an instrumental 
variable. The Sargan test for overidentification is non-significant, indicating instruments are 
valid. Our findings remain substantively unchanged. 
As an additional test for robustness of results, we also re-estimate the model using our 
preferred estimation strategy, but with the dependent variable as government health spending 
as a share of GDP, a widely used measure of political priorities on health. We record 
consistent results, which are available in Web Appendix 6. Each binding IMF condition is 
associated with a percent point decrease of 0.007 (-0.013 to -0.001) in government health 
spending as a share of GDP. 
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Lastly, we check whether results are driven by outliers. We initially exclude observations 
with 50 or more conditions—yielding a total of five exclusions—and re-estimate the model. 
We then exclude based on the less stringent criterion of 40 or more conditions, which 
eliminates an additional 14 observations. Results remain substantively the same throughout, 
as reported in Web Appendix 6. 
5. Discussion 
Our study finds that IMF conditionality reduced government health expenditures in West 
Africa, the region with greatest exposure to Fund programmes in Africa. We identify three 
pathways linking IMF-mandated policies to decreases in government health spending in the 
region: macroeconomic targets that reduce fiscal space for investment in health, limits to 
wage bills and civil service employment ceilings that inhibit hiring and retention of health 
staff, and decentralisation measures that amplify budget execution challenges in the health 
sector.  
Before discussing these findings, we note several limitations. First, we restrict our analysis to 
evidence identified in the IMF’s own archival documents. It is possible that additional effects 
on health systems are not reported in archival data. Future in-depth analyses of country 
experiences can help uncover these links. Second, statements by country officials may not 
always be evidence-based, since they may be a product of political expedience. To minimize 
such potential biases, we have verified the accuracy of officials’ statements using various 
contextual indicators of health system performance (e.g., WHO health systems data). Third, 
we recognize that the IMF is not the sole international financial institution involved in these 
countries. Other organizations—like the World Bank and the African Development Bank—
also affect health systems in West Africa (Coburn, Restivo, & Shandra, 2015; Ruger, 2005), 
often in parallel programmes with the IMF. Fourth for our quantitative analysis, we 
acknowledge that using a binding condition count does not fully capture IMF programme 
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heterogeneity. Even so, it is still a major advance on previous studies, where program 
heterogeneity is largely ignored. 
Though our quantitative analysis reveals a negative association between IMF conditionality 
and government health spending, the aggregate impact of the IMF—programme participation 
and conditionality combined—is not statistically different from zero. Furthermore, our 
analysis cannot completely rule out that—unlike conditionality—the IMF’s credit, technical 
assistance, or catalytic effect on aid may help increase government health spending. The 
association of IMF participation with health spending independent of the conditionality 
channel was positive, but failed to reach standard thresholds of significance (i.e., estimated 
with low precision). Overall, while we fail to find quantitative evidence that the IMF on 
aggregate has any impact on government health spending, it is nonetheless the case that each 
additional binding condition is associated with decreases in government spending. 
Our findings have broader implications for contemporary policy debates about the role of the 
IMF in efforts to reach the global target of UHC. In recent years, the IMF has promoted 
social protection policies and health systems strengthening as part of its lending programs 
(IMF, 2015a). However, the evidence presented reveals that—under direct IMF tutelage—
some of the world’s poorest countries underfunded their health systems. The legacy of such 
policies affects these countries’ progress towards UHC attainment—a key Sustainable 
Development Goal. 
Looking forward, our research suggests that the IMF should consider the potential effects of 
its policies on public health systems. Given the current momentum for UHC, the organization 
has the opportunity to facilitate this process by allowing policy space for borrowing countries 
to invest in health and determine their health policies free from the influence of unduly 
restrictive conditionalities. In doing so, the IMF can learn from and collaborate with its sister 
institution, the World Bank, that recently supported the goal of UHC.  
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Box 1. How do IMF programmes affect health systems? 
The IMF proposes three channels through which its programmes are linked to strengthening 
of health systems. First, IMF-supported reforms improve economic growth or raise tax 
revenues, thereby expanding fiscal space to allow governments to invest in public health 
(Clements et al., 2013; Crivelli & Gupta, 2015). Second, the inclusion of social spending 
floors in IMF programmes shelters sensitive expenditures from austerity measures (Gupta, 
Dicks-Mireaux, Khemani, McDonald, & Verhoeven, 2000; Gupta, 2010; IMF, 2015a). Third, 
implementation of the IMF’s policy advice catalyses foreign aid (including for health) and 
foreign investment (Clements et al., 2013; IEO, 2007b).  
In contrast, critics argue that governments are unable to adequately invest in health because 
of pressure to meet rigid fiscal deficit targets set by the IMF, and that the organization diverts 
additional revenues and aid earmarked for the health sector to repay debt or increase reserves 
(Kentikelenis, King, et al., 2015; Kentikelenis, Stubbs, et al., 2015; Ooms & Schrecker, 2005; 
Stuckler et al., 2011, 2008; Stuckler & Basu, 2009). Additional evidence suggests that IMF-
supported programmes decrease economic growth (Barro & Lee, 2005; Dreher, 2006; 
Przeworski & Vreeland, 2000), thereby shrinking available resources to fund health systems, 
and that the organization’s programmes do not catalyse health aid (Stubbs, Kentikelenis, & 
King, 2016). 
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Figure 1. IMF conditionality in African countries, 1995-2014 
 
Note: Blank space denotes no IMF conditionality applicable in that country. 
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Figure 2. Joint effect of IMF programme participation and conditionality on 
government health spending per capita, with 95% confidence intervals 
 
Note: Predictive margins based on Model 2 (see Table 2). 
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Table 1. Targets on health and other social spending, 1995-2014 
 
Total 
Of which implementation 
data available 
Of which implemented 
Benin 30 29 10 
Burkina Faso 32 21 8 
Cabo Verde 0 0 0 
Cote d'Ivoire 29 22 15 
Gambia 6 3 3 
Ghana 19 16 12 
Guinea 27 17 3 
Guinea-Bissau 12 7 3 
Liberia 15 12 9 
Mali 19 16 10 
Mauritania 25 13 4 
Niger 16 11 2 
Nigeria 0 0 0 
Senegal 0 0 0 
Sierra Leone 42 36 16 
Togo 11 7 2 
TOTAL 283 210 97 
Note: Number of targets (spending floors) reported. Spending floors are set for “priority 
expenditures” that include health, education, and other social sectors.  
Source: Various IMF lending arrangements retrieved from the IMF archives. 
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Table 2. Effect of IMF conditionality on government health spending, 1995-2012 
 
 
Dependent variable: Log government health expenditure per capita 
(constant 2005 US$) 
 
Model 1: IMF programme dummy 
only 
Coefficient [95% CI] 
Model 2: IMF programme dummy 
and number of IMF conditions 
Coefficient [95% CI] 
IMF condition (lagged)  -0.00248* [-0.00435,-0.000599] 
IMF programme 
(lagged) 
0.0877 [-0.0568,0.232] 0.116 [-0.0283,0.261] 
Log GDP per capita 
(lagged) 
0.547 [-0.365,1.460] 0.543 [-0.350,1.435] 
Log ODA per capita 
(lagged) 
0.168** [0.0717,0.264] 0.185** [0.0834,0.286] 
Dependency ratio 0.00420 [-0.0105,0.0190] 0.00463 [-0.00986,0.0191] 
Urbanisation 0.0901 [-0.00753,0.188] 0.0917 [-0.000751,0.184] 
War 0.103 [-0.397,0.602] 0.0849 [-0.419,0.589] 
Inverse-Mills ratio 0.678* [0.00140, 0.134] 0.0866** [0.0261,0.147] 
Number of countries 16 16 
Country-years 276 276  
R2 0.913 0.914 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Coefficients and 95% CIs are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by country. All models correct for country and year fixed effects. 
Data sources and descriptive statistics are provided in Web Appendix 2-3. 
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Web Appendix 1. Categories of conditions 
The IMF’s conditions can be either quantitative or structural. The former take the form of 
quantitative targets that countries have to meet and often maintain throughout the programme 
period. Structural conditions concern a wider range of reforms in the domestic economy and 
afford governments less flexibility. Building on the quantitative–structural divide, the IMF 
formally distinguishes five types of conditions, which are indicative of the relative weight it 
attaches to their implementation. These five types can be further grouped into binding 
conditions (those that the IMF places most weight on) and non-binding conditions (less 
weight attached and can relatively easily be modified as the programme progresses). The Box 
below illustrates this assemblage and summarizes the key characteristics of each type.  
 
Note: Red boxes identify binding conditions; green boxes identify non-binding conditions. 
   
Quantitative Performance Criteria (QPCs): Specific and measurable conditions that have 
to be met to complete a review. QPCs relate to macroeconomic variables under the control of 
the governments, such as monetary and credit aggregates, international reserves, fiscal 
balances, and external borrowing. 
Indicative Benchmarks: Also known as indicative targets, these are used to supplement 
QPCs for assessing progress. Sometimes they are also set when QPCs cannot because of data 
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uncertainty about economic trends (e.g. for the later months of a program). As uncertainty is 
reduced, these targets are normally turned into QPCs, with appropriate modifications. 
Prior Actions: Conditions that a country agrees to take before the IMF’s EB approves 
financing or completes a review. The Fund considers these conditions so important as to 
block access to further financing until they are implemented. They are used especially in 
cases where the borrowing country has not consistently implemented the programme and the 
Fund staff doubt commitment to the programme. These are the strictest conditions. 
Structural Performance Criteria (SPCs): Structural measures whose implementation is 
regarded as crucial to the success of the programme and have to be met to complete a review. 
These conditions often involve legislative reforms such as the enactment of a new banking or 
bankruptcy law.  
Structural Benchmarks: These are (often non-quantifiable) reform measures that are critical 
to achieve programme goals and are intended as markers to assess programme 
implementation during a review. They vary across programs: examples are measures to 
improve financial sector operations, build up social safety nets, or strengthen public financial 
management. 
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Web Appendix 2. Description and sources of data 
Variable Description Source 
Government health 
spending 
Measured as per capita (logged) and in 
robustness checks as a share of GDP 
World Bank WDI, 
May 2015 
Binding conditions 
Total count of Quantitative Performance Criteria, 
Structural Performance Criteria, Prior Action 
conditions in IMF programme 
Authors’ calculations 
IMF programme 
Dummy variable: = 1 if IMF programme active 
for 6 or more months in year of initiation, and at 
any point in year of completion, 0 otherwise 
Authors’ calculations 
GDP per capita 
Gross domestic product per capita in constant 
2005 USD (logged) 
World Bank WDI, 
May 2015 
ODA per capita 
Net overseas development assistance per capita in 
USD (logged) 
World Bank WDI, 
May 2015 
Dependency ratio 
Combined share of the population aged under 15 
and over 65 
Authors’ calculations 
using WDI data 
Urbanisation level 
Urban population as a share of the total 
population 
World Bank WDI, 
May 2015 
War dummy 
= 1 if year featured an armed conflict resulting in 
1000 or more deaths, 0 otherwise 
UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset, v4-
2015 
GDP growth Annual growth in gross domestic product 
World Bank WDI, 
May 2015 
Current account 
balance 
Current account balance as a share of GDP 
IMF WEO, April 
2014 
 37 
Democracy 
Average of Freedom House and Imputed Polity 
measures of democracy, transformed to a scale of 
0-10 
Quality of 
Governance 
Database, 2015 
Countries on IMF 
programmes 
Total number of countries under IMF 
programmes in a given year 
Authors’ calculations 
UN General Assembly 
voting affinity with 
United States 
Voting similarity index on a scale ranging from 0 
to 1, where 1 is perfect similarity and 0 is perfect 
difference 
United Nations 
General Assembly 
Voting Data, 2013 
 
Works cited: 
Gleditsch, N., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., & Strand, H. UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2015. Uppsala Conflict Data Program & Centre for the Study of 
Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute. 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/ (accessed July 
03, 2015). 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). World Economic Outlook Data: April 2014 Edition. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx (accessed May 20, 2015). 
Strezhnev, A. & Voeten, E. United Nations General Assembly Voting Data, 2013. 
http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Voeten (accessed 8 October, 2014). 
Teorell, J., Dahlberg S., Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., Hartmann, F., & Svensson, R. The Quality of 
Government Standard Dataset, Version Jan 15. University of Gothenburg, Quality of 
Government Institute. http://www.qog.pol.gu.se (accessed May 20, 2015). 
World Bank. World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/ (accessed May 20, 2015).
 38 
Web Appendix 3. Descriptive statistics 
 
N Mean Median SD Min Max 
Dependent variable 
Government health spending per capita 
(log) 
285 2.348 2.360 0.777 0.578 4.461 
Explanatory variables 
L.Binding conditions 288 16.028 17.000 15.851 0.000 72.000 
L.Binding conditions when L.IMF 
programme dummy = 1 
202 22.129 24.00 14.842 0.000 72.000 
L.IMF programme dummy 288 0.701 1.000 0.458 0.000 1.000 
L.GDP per capita (log) 288 6.155 6.078 0.589 3.913 7.915 
L.ODA per capita (log) 288 3.815 3.850 1.007 0.237 6.504 
Dependency ratio 288 88.406 87.433 8.469 55.435 110.957 
Urbanisation level 288 4.054 4.031 1.105 0.187 8.621 
War dummy 288 0.014 0.000 0.117 0.000 1.000 
Additional selection variables 
Countries on IMF programmes 288 58.944 62.500 9.412 36.000 72.000 
L.GDP growth 288 5.006 4.400 8.728 -32.832 106.280 
L.Capital account balance 276 -6.882 -6.589 8.140 -54.754 25.335 
L.Democracy 288 5.451 5.417 2.388 1.000 10.000 
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Web Appendix 4. Correlation matrix 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Government health spending per capita (log) [1] 1.000 
       
L.IMF programme dummy [2] 0.014 1.000 
      
L.Binding conditions [3] 0.012 0.582 1.000 
     
L.GDP per capita (log) [4] 0.836 -0.123 -0.126 1.000 
    
L.ODA per capita (log) [5] 0.474 0.229 0.267 0.283 1.000 
   
Dependency ratio [6] -0.416 0.262 0.136 -0.480 -0.204 1.000 
  
Urbanisation level [7] -0.201 0.093 0.048 -0.368 -0.158 0.555 1.000 
 
War dummy [8] -0.122 0.011 -0.004 -0.129 -0.040 -0.049 -0.272 1.000 
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Web Appendix 5. Controlling for selection bias using the Heckman method 
Since participation in IMF programmes is a non-random treatment (i.e., countries opt into the 
programme), then ‘selection bias’ – a form of endogeneity – may be introduced to the 
analyses if the same forces that determine IMF participation also affect government health 
expenditures. If we fail to account for these factors then their effects may erroneously be 
attributed to IMF programme participation or conditionality. While observable variables 
affecting both selection into an IMF programme and government health spending are already 
included as controls in our model (e.g., GDP per capita), we cannot directly control for 
unobservable factors such as ‘political will’ (i.e., an executive dedicated to overcoming 
economic difficulties versus one that is more interested in personal empowerment).  
To address the issue of ‘selection bias’ we adopt Heckman’s (1979) two-step method. First, 
we run a probit regression to predict IMF participation: 
IMFi,t  =  γZi,t  +  ηi,t     (a) 
where IMF participation is assumed to be a linear function of a list of covariates, Zi,t, and a 
stochastic component, ηi,t. In the presence of selection bias, ε from equation (1) in the main 
manuscript1 and η from equation (a) are correlated. 
We then compute the ‘inverse-Mills ratio’ or hazard, , for each observation in the sample: 
      (b) 
where φ denotes the standard normal density function, Φ the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function, and  is an estimated value taken from equation (a).  
                                                 
1 For reference, equation (1) is presented below: 
HXPit = α + β1 IMFCONDit-1 + β2 IMFPROGit-1 + β3 GDPPCit-1 + β4 ODAit-1 + β5 DEPit +   
β6 URBANit + β7 WARit + β8 INVMILLSit + μi + ψt + εit 
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Second, we add the estimated hazard to the vector of controls in equation (1). Its coefficient 
is interpreted as follows: if significantly negative, then unobserved variables that make IMF 
participation more likely are associated with lower government health expenditure; if 
significantly positive, then unobserved variables that make IMF participation more likely are 
associated with higher government health expenditure; if non-significant, then there is no 
association. 
We tested alternative specifications for the first-stage probit model used in the relevant 
literature and all performed similarly, correctly predicting circa 80% of the cases. For our 
specification, right-hand variables include the total number of countries on IMF programmes, 
log GDP per capita (lagged one year), log ODA per capita (lagged one year), GDP growth 
(lagged one year), current account balance (lagged one year), level of democracy (lagged one 
year), dependency ratio, urbanisation, and occurrence of war. We could not include 
government balance (lagged one year) as it unduly reduced observations due to missing data. 
The total number of countries on IMF programmes acts as our “exclusion restriction” 
(Oberdabernig, 2013; Sturm, Berger, & de Haan, 2005): a variable that is significant in 
explaining the country’s participation decision in IMF programs but is not correlated with the 
dependent variable of the outcome equation, in our case government health spending.  
 
Frequencies of actual and predicted outcomes 
  Predicted 
 
 
0 1 Total 
A
ct
u
al
 
0 36 41 77 
1 13 186 199 
Total 49 227 276 
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Correctly predicted: 80.4% 
 
 
Results of probit model to generate inverse-Mills ratio 
Dependent variable: IMF programme participation 
  Countries on IMF programmes 0.033*** 
 [0.009]    
GDP growth (lagged) 0.008 
 [0.014]    
Capital account balance (lagged) 0.006 
 [0.012]    
Democracy (lagged) 0.014 
 [0.044]    
Log GDP per capita (lagged) -0.422**  
 [0.210]    
Log ODA per capita (lagged) 0.473*** 
 [0.101]    
Dependency ratio 0.042*** 
 [0.015]    
Urbanisation 0.021 
 [0.125]    
War -0.786 
 [0.736]    
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Constant -4.274**  
 [1.976]    
N 276 
pseudo R-sq 0.201 
Standard errors in brackets 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
For additional examples of selection bias corrections in studies on the effects of IMF, see 
Clements et al. (2013), IEO (2003), Nooruddin and Simmons (2009), and Vreeland (2003). 
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Web Appendix 6. Robustness checks 
Model Base: Heckman Robust: 2SLS Robust: Heckman 
Robust: No Outliers 
(observations with 
>=50 conditions) 
Robust: No Outliers 
(observations with 
>=40 conditions) 
Dependent variable 
Log government health 
expenditure per capita 
Log government health 
expenditure per capita 
Government health 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
Log government health 
expenditure per capita 
Log government health 
expenditure per capita 
IMF condition (lagged) -0.0025* -0.0161* -0.0068* -0.0033** -0.0028* 
 
[0.0009] [0.0063] [0.0027] [0.0011] [0.0013] 
IMF programme (lagged) 0.1161 0.3065 0.2959 0.1232 0.1275 
 
[0.0678] [0.2083] [0.1407] [0.0677] [0.0703] 
Log GDP per capita 
(lagged) 
0.5426 0.7993*** -0.8363 
0.5380 0.5502 
 
[0.4186] [0.2043] [0.9478] [0.4265] [0.4455] 
Log ODA per capita 
(lagged) 
0.1846** 0.2679*** 0.4163** 
0.1878** 0.1769**  
 
[0.0475] [0.0666] [0.1378] [0.0499] [0.0501] 
 46 
Dependency ratio 0.0046 0.0103 0.0121 0.0049 0.0058 
 
[0.0068] [0.0064] [0.0179] [0.0068] [0.0069]    
Urbanisation 0.0917 0.0496 0.2103* 0.0915* 0.0872 
 
[0.0434] [0.0393] [0.0931] [0.0419] [0.0463] 
War 0.0849 0.1194 0.5843* 0.0846 0.0383 
 
[0.2365] [0.2227] [0.2640] [0.2421] [0.2466] 
Inverse-Mills ratio 0.0866** 
 
0.1372 0.0900**  0.0860**  
 
[0.0284] 
 
[0.0674] [0.0265] [0.0256] 
Constant -2.797 -4.9278** 3.1091 -2.807 -2.9128 
 
[3.0237] [1.5466] [7.1318] [3.0707] [3.2122] 
Country/Year dummies Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes 
Country-years 276 272 276 271 257 
R2 0.9143 0.8601 0.7078 0.9149 0.9178 
Number of countries 16 16 16 16 16 
 Notes: Standard errors in brackets; IMF variables are instrumented with United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting affinity with the United States 
and countries under IMF programmes in the 2SLS model; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
